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IN I HE U r ?i.1 r ' i )URT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appell* e, : Case No. 960745-CA 
v. : 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, : i r i i I N 2 
Def enddi ii ky\, I ( I , : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE ' 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS • 
This is an appeal from a conviction -. IL 
of murder, a ( i> i «ie-«M-e felony, and five counts of theft, a second 
degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, 
the Honorable Pat B Brian presminij u i i having been poured 
over
 r .: ' ;ne Court, this Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. § ^ a 3 . ' 2 ) / J % ^ 9 9 5 ) . 
ISSUES : APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
x. Did the trial court properly refuse to sever the murder count 
from the theft counts, whicn m v u weapon and other 
items acilitate defendant's flight after the murder? 
Because w[t]he trial court has discretion t M, ipctjii I
 ( ,a 
severance request if tAAe Lrial judge fs 
refusal to sever charges is a clear abuse of discretion in that it 
sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial." 
State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Utah App. 1996) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
2. Has defendant established that his unjustified refusal to 
cooperate with his second appointed attorney deprived him of his right 
to effective assistance of counsel? 
"Whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent defendant 
who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel, but 
who has no constitutional right to appointment of a different attorney, 
is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and 
will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Pursifell. 
746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App. 1987) (citation omitted). However, 
"courts have no discretion to allow a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment." Id. at 274. 
3 . Can a defendant who was in fact represented by counsel at 
trial claim on appeal that his purported waiver of counsel in the 
trial court was not knowing and intelligent? 
* [A] trial court's determination of whether a defendant has 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel 
%is a determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness, as opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for 
2 
clear error.'" State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 781 (Utah App. 1996) 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). However, "trial 
courts have a reasonable measure of discretion when applying this 
area of law to a given set of facts." Xd- However, since defendant 
was in fact represented at trial, the court here made no such 
determination. 
4. Could reasonable jurors have convicted defendant, who shot 
his wife six times in the head through two pillows while she was lying 
in bed, of intentional murder? 
uIn considering that question, [this Court will] review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [It will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted); accord State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following 
provisions: 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (Supp. 1996). "Single criminal 
episode" defined - Joinder of offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which 
is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or 
modify the effect of Section 77~8a-l in controlling the 
joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) & -(2) (1995). Separate offenses 
arising out of single criminal episode - Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses 
under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise 
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject 
to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single 
court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l), -(3) & -(4) (1995). Joinder 
of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may 
be charged in the same indictment or information if each 
offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or 
plan. 
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(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments 
or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, 
and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have 
been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution 
were under a single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder 
for trial together, the court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of 
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least five 
days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for 
severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose 
any statements made by the defendants which he intends to 
introduce in evidence at the trial. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5. Charged multiple offenses - To be filed 
in single court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, 
citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which 
may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, 
or municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal 
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in 
a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense 
with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses 
charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or 
information may not be separated except by order of the court 
and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is 
adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has 
jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a single 
prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 23 August 
1995 with one count of murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), and five counts of theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 
1-2, addendum A) . Defendant pled not guilty to all counts (R. 192) . 
After arraignment, defendant filed a pro se motion to remove 
Glen Cook as his appointed counsel (R. 193) . Although no minute entry 
or order was entered, the court's docket indicates that a motion 
hearing was held and the court was informed that the "problem has 
been resolved" (R. 207). 
On 22 January 1996, defendant filed a second pro se motion to 
remove Glen Cook as his counsel (R. 233-36) . The letter alleges that 
"numerous face to face conversations have resulted in total polarity. 
There appears to be no attempt to understand the requests and questions 
that the undersigned asks to the extent that several jailers have 
expressed concern regarding the relationship" (R. 235). After a motion 
hearing, the court granted defendant's motion (R. 253-54). Joseph 
C. Fratto, Jr. was appointed to represent defendant (R. 267). 
Apparently depressed over the death of his former wife,1 defendant 
refused to eat solid food, stating that he wanted "to experience the 
1
 It is possible they were still legally married (R. 307). 
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suffering that his first wife experienced while she was dying of 
cancer" (R. 286) . The State filed a Petition for Inquiry into Mental 
Condition of Defendant and a Petition to Force-Feed Defendant (R. 
282-87). The court ordered defendant committed to the Utah State 
Hospital for a period of 30 days for observation and treatment (R. 
290) . Following assessment and a hearing, the court determined that 
defendant was competent to stand trial (R. 345-46) • 
On 15 April 1996, defense counsel moved to sever the murder count 
from the theft counts on the ground that "the substance of these 
offenses do not constitute a single criminal episode" (R. 294). The 
court denied this motion after hearing and entered findings and 
conclusions (R. 535-41). 
By letter dated 20 April 1996, defendant personally requested 
the Utah State Bar to grant a change of venue and to dismiss his 
counsel, Joseph Fratto (R. 317-22). Defendant claimed that his 
confidence in Mr. Fratto was shaken; that Mr. Fratto's investigator 
had failed to follow up within the week of their interview as 
represented; that Mr. Fratto "initiated and arranged with prosecuting 
attorney Robert W. Adkins[] to transfer [defendant] to Utah State 
Hospital, Provo"; and that Mr. Fratto ignored the request of 
defendant's social worker to have legal materials delivered to him 
at the hospital (R. 317-19) . 
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Twenty-seven days before the scheduled trial date, Mr. Fratto 
moved to withdraw as counsel on the ground that he was allegedly 
"unable to adequately and effectively represent the defendant" (R. 
365; see also Fratto Affidavit, R. 366-68, addendum D). 
On 8 May 1996 the trial court held a hearing at which it heard 
"arguments of counsel and statements of defendant" (R. 420, addendum 
E). The court continued the trial, but denied Mr. Fratto's motion 
on the grounds that (1) it had already removed one attorney; (2) Mr, 
Fratto was experienced, qualified, and competent; (3) there was "no 
legitimate basis" for defendant's refusal to cooperate with Mr. Fratto; 
and (4) u[t]here is [no] reason to believe based on defendant's past 
behavior [that] he will cooperate or be satisfied with another 
attorney" (R. 419-20, addendum E)• 
After a three-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty 
on all counts (R. 519-24). Judgment and Commitment was entered 26 
August 1996 (545-46) . Defendant received statutory sentences, 
including a firearms enhancement (R. 544-45) . Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 550) . The Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to 
the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 560). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Three months after marrying Kayleen Jones, defendant shot her 
six times in the head with her brother's .22 caliber rifle (R. 681, 
704, 722, 782-83, 787, 928-29, St. Ex. 42). He shot her through two 
pillows while she was lying in bed (R. 870-76, 881-83) .3 
Carl ^beat the hell out of him'' 
When Kayleen Jones was living in Kingman, Arizona, she had a 
boyfriend who "beat her up" (R. 704, 723). Defendant Carl Scales 
"took after the guy, and beat the hell out of him, and . . . went 
home to get a pistol . . . to kill the S.O.B." (R. 704) . When 
defendant returned, uthe guy was gone" (id.). Out of this rescue, 
Kayleen and defendant developed a romance and, in May of 1995, were 
married (R. 677, 704, 722, St. Ex. 42). He was 34, she was 40 (R. 
719, St. Ex. 42). 
In June they moved into a mobile home owned by Kayleen's brother, 
Wade Jones, on a ranch in Upton, Utah (R. 678, 696, 718, 723) . Wade 
had left two .22 rifles and a 30-06 in a hidden compartment in the 
trailer because he had small children at home (R. 696-97) . 
2
 This brief recites facts from the record in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989) . 
3
 She suffered no "defensive wounds'' (R. 786) . 
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*He wanted to kill the rat" 
On Sunday 6 August 1995, Wade was working at a water well near 
the trailer (R. 679-80). Defendant told him that he was going to 
clean out a storage tank "and there was a rat in the tank, and he 
wanted to kill the rat" by shooting it (R. 680). Wade offered to 
lend defendant his .22 (id.) . Defendant agreed, and Wade loaned him 
his loaded .22 Ruger automatic rifle (R. 681). However, defendant 
did not "go after the rat" with it (R. 716). 
Kayleen's mother lived in a house "a couple hundred yards" away 
from the trailer (R. 724) . That Sunday night at around 9:30 she was 
working in her yard and heard defendant and Kayleen "yelling at each 
other" for about five minutes in their trailer (R. 726-27). 
The next morning, defendant visited Kayleen's grandmother, Mabel 
Jones, who also lived on the ranch (R. 740, 742) . He told her that 
the rods had gone out on their car4 and he "was supposed to be in 
South Fork in 30 minutes" (R. 743) .5 He said, "Kayleen said maybe 
Grandma would let you take her car that far" (id.). She replied that 
her Monte Carlo was unlicensed and did not have much gas in it (id.) 
4
 In fact, Kayleen's Mazda was in running order; it had not 
thrown a rod (R. 726, 904-05). However, it was not as 
"roadworthy" as the grandmother's car (R. 906). 
5
 The South Fork of Chalk Creek was about six or seven miles 
away (R. 743). 
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Defendant replied, "That's no problem. I have gas" (id). She then 
gave him the keys with instructions not to go further than South Fork 
(R. 744) • 
"He had a little trouble at home" 
Defendant left his wallet in the trailer kitchen, took Wade's 
rifles from the trailer, loaded them into the trunk of the Monte Carlo 
(R. 700, 835-36, 867-69), and drove west on 1-80 with two hitchhikers 
(R. 827-29). When asked where he was headed, defendant "was kind 
of vague about that, didn't seem to . . . [have] a set destination 
that he wanted to go to" (R. 830) . He mentioned that "he had a little 
trouble at home, just wanted to get away for a while" (R. 844). 
Defendant said that uhe had a couple of guns he would like to 
sell. He was short on money" (R. 832). He sold the 30-06 to a man 
in a bar in Wells for $100 and two beers (R. 833, 836-39) . He sold 
the Ruger .22 for $25 at a gas stop in Valmy, Nevada (R. 916-19). 
That Monday evening, Kayleen's mother walked over to the trailer 
to talk to Kayleen (R. 727-30) . All three exterior doors were locked 
(R. 731, 752). She called Wade, who unlocked the trailer and found 
Kayleen's body in the bed in the master bedroom (R. 683, 691-92, 731-
32) . Her head was covered with two pillows, one of which was saturated 
with blood (R. 693) . Spent .22 casings lay about the room (R. 695). 
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The casings had been fired from the rifle Wade had loaned to defendant 
(R. 928). 
There were no signs of struggle or forced entry (R. 753, 876). 
A necklace was at the entrance to the master bedroom; on the floor 
of the bedroom was Kayleen and defendant's marriage certificate, torn 
into pieces (R. 877) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Severance, The trial court properly refused to sever the 
murder and theft charges. The controlling question is not whether, 
the charges arose out of a single criminal episode, but (1) whether 
the charges were connected together in their commission; and (2) 
whether joinder resulted in prejudice. 
Defendant committed the murder with one of the stolen rifles, 
fled the murder scene in the stolen car, and stole all four rifles 
to finance his flight. The charges were clearly connected together 
in their commission. 
Since defendant did not allege prejudice in the trial court, 
this prong of the analysis is waived. However, he suffered no 
prejudice in any event, since evidence of the murder charge would 
have been admissible in a trial on the theft counts, and vice versa. 
2. Ineffective assistance. Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
ineffectiveness claim fails because he created the communication 
12 
breakdown on which it rests. Courts that have ruled on the issue have 
concluded that u [a] defendant cannot base a claim of inadequate 
representation upon his refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel.1* 
Shaw y, United States, 403 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1968). 
In addition, the trial court found uno legitimate basis for the 
defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with 
his court-appointed counsel in the preparation of the case" (R. 360). 
Defendant has not and cannot attack this finding, since it is based 
on statements in a hearing that defendant has failed to include in 
the record on appeal. 
3. uWaiver of counsel." Defendant's claim that the trial court 
failed to ensure that his waiver of counsel was "knowing and 
intelligent" fails because defendant was in fact represented at trial. 
Mr. Fratto identified himself as defendant's counsel and actively 
participated at trial. Because defendant did not elect to waive 
counsel or represent himself, no inquiry into waiver of his right 
to counsel was required. 
4. Sufficiency. Defendant borrowed the murder weapon from his 
brother-in-law the day of the murder for the ostensible purpose of 
shooting of rat. Instead, he used it to shoot Kayleen six times in 
the head through two pillows while she was lying in bed. She suffered 
no defensive wounds, and the trailer showed no signs of struggle. 
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From these facts, reasonable jurors could infer that defendant 
borrowed the rifle with the intent to kill his wife; that Kayleen 
was sleeping or resting when defendant killed her; and that defendant 
used the pillows the muffle the sound of the gunshots and thus avoid 
detection. These inferences support a finding that defendant killed 
Kayleen Scales intentionally or knowingly. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SEVER THE MURDER AND 
THEFT CHARGES BECAUSE THE CHARGES WERE CONNECTED TOGETHER 
IN THEIR COMMISSION" AND DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to sever 
the murder charge from the theft charges. Br. Aplt. at 9. 
Trial court ruling. Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) 
and rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant moved to 
sever the murder count from the theft counts on the ground that "the 
substance of these offenses do not constitute a single criminal 
episode" (R. 294, 309). The State opposed the motion, relying on 
those provisions and on Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (1995) (R. 388-89) . 
The court denied severance (R. 540-41, addendum C). It found 
that flight was a factor the jury could consider in determining whether 
defendant had committed the murder; that evidence of his flight would 
consequently be permitted at trial; that the State intended to argue 
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at trial that defendant accomplished his flight by stealing Mabel 
Jones's car and that he took Wade Jones's firearms either to finance 
his flight or to dispose of evidence from the murder scene; that u[t]he 
events of the homicide, and the thefts of the automobile and the four 
firearms are closely related in time and place"; that "the State would 
still be able to present its evidence regarding the theft of the 
vehicle and the firearms during the murder trial" even if the counts 
were severed; and that "[t]he thefts of the car and firearms are 
integral, as they relate to the commission of the murder or flight 
after the commission of the murder." (R. 536-37, addendum B). 
Standard of review. Because "[t]he trial court has discretion 
to grant or deny a severance request," this Court will reverse "only 
if the trial judge's refusal to sever charges is a clear abuse of 
discretion in that it sacrifices the defendant's right to a 
fundamentally fair trial." State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 652-53 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
A. Charges need not arise out of a "single criminal episode'7 
in order to be properly joined. 
Defendant asserts that the question on appeal "is whether the 
theft of the car and guns was indeed part of a single criminal episode 
precipitated by murder, and the answer is no." Br. Aplt. at 9-10 
(emphasis added). On the contrary, whether the crimes arose from 
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a "single criminal episode" is irrelevant to the severance issue in 
this case.6 
Defendant relies on 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
 t 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995), see Br. Aplt. at 10, which are 
"single criminal episode'' provisions. These provisions address when 
charges must be joined, not when they must be severed. 
Rule 9.5 provides that informations charging multiple offenses 
arising from a single criminal episode must be filed in a single court 
and may not be separated except by court order for good cause shown. 
As to charges arising from a single criminal episode, this rule 
requires joinder. As to charges not arising from a single criminal 
episode, this rule is silent. 
Section 76-1-401 defines "single criminal episode." However, 
it also provides that " [n] othing in this part shall be construed to 
limit or modify the effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the 
joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings." Thus, 
section 77-8a-l, discussed below, controls here.7 
6
 By asserting the irrelevance of the "single criminal 
episode" analysis, the State is not conceding that the crimes are 
not part of a "single criminal episode" as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) . They clearly were. 
7
 Although defendant does not cite this provision on appeal, 
he argued it in the trial court (see R. 1010) . 
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The cases cited by defendant are equally unhelpful. For example, 
this Court has ruled that State v. Cornish. 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) 
and State v. Ireland. 570 P.2d 1206 (1977), £££ Br. Aplt. at 11-12, 
are "not applicable" to a severance case "because they do not deal 
with the issues of joinder and severance of charges, but with 
determining if criminal acts are separate for double jeopardy 
purposes." State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah 1990). 
Similarly, State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), &££ Br. 
Aplt. at 10, interprets a repealed statutory provision. Germonto 
based his argument on rule 9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
the Utah Supreme Court decided the case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9 
(1990), which was repealed by the time it ruled. Jd- at 59, 59 n.6. 
Thus, the court noted, "Both provisions have since been repealed and 
recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (Supp. 1992)." Id. 
B. Charges may be joined if they are "connected together 
in their commission" and joinder does not unfairly 
prejudice defendant or prosecution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995) controls this issue. It states, 
in pertinent part: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may 
be charged in the same indictment or information if each 
offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission: or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or 
clan. 
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(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments 
or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, 
and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have 
been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder 
for trial together, the court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of 
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l)# -(3) (a) & -(4) (a) (1995) (emphasis added) . 
In State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1996), this Court applied 
the two-step analysis implicit in section 77-8a-l. 
In Smith, after a visitor suffered death by a drug overdose at 
Smith's trailer home, Smith was charged with manslaughter, failing 
to report a dead body, and evidence tampering (he disposed of the 
drug paraphernalia in a convenience store dumpster). J£. at 650-51. 
The trial court dismissed the charge of failing to report a dead body 
and the jury acquitted Smith of manslaughter, but he was convicted 
on evidence tampering. lii. at 651. 
Smith argued on appeal that the charges were improperly joined 
and should have been severed. X£. at 652. This Court held that 
u[b]ecause the offenses with which Smith was charged were 'otherwise 
connected together in their commission' and he was not unfairly 
prejudiced by their joinder, . . . the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Smith's severance motion." !£. at 655. 
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Smith delineated a two-step analysis. Step one focuses on the 
relationship between the charges: are they ubased on the same conduct/7 
acts "otherwise connected together in their commission/' or conduct 
"alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan"? id. at 653. 
Step two asks whether joinder will prejudice the defendant. 
Id. at 653-54. The standard is high: "The burden of demonstrating 
prejudice is a difficult one, and the ruling of the trial judge will 
rarely be disturbed on review. The defendant must show something 
more than the fact that a separate trial might offer him a better 
chance of acquittal." Smith. 927 P.2d at 654 (quoting United States 
v. Van Scoy. 482 F.2d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Clearly, if "evidence of the other crimes would have 
been admissible in a separate trial/' severance cannot prejudice the 
defendant. Smith/ 927 P.2d at 654 (quoting State v. Lee. 831 P.2d 
114, 118, 119 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)). 
Both steps of the Smith analysis are satisfied here. 
1. The murder and theft charges were both "connected 
together in their commission" and "part of a common 
scheme or plan." 
All charges here were "connected together in their commission" 
or "part of a common scheme or plan/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (a) . 
In fact, the trial court found that the murder and theft counts were 
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"integral, as they relate to the commission of the murder or flight 
after the commission of the murder" (R. 536, addendum B). 
Smith stated that "'when criminal conduct resulting in a second 
charge is precipitated by a previous charge, the two are sufficiently 
"connected together" to allow consolidation for trial.'" Smith. 927 
P.2d at 653 (quoting State v. Pondexter. 671 P.2d 539, 546 (Kan. 
1983)) . That is the situation here: defendant committed the murder 
with one of the stolen rifles, fled the murder scene in the stolen 
car, and stole all four rifles to finance his flight. See pp. 9-12 
herein. Thus, the murder obviously precipitated defendant's flight, 
which was accomplished by means of the thefts. 
2. Joinder did not prejudice defendant because evidence 
of the thefts would have been admissible in the murder 
case. 
Preservation. No inquiry into potential prejudice is required 
on appeal, because defendant failed to preserve the issue in the trial 
court. "Trial counsel must state clearly and specifically all grounds 
for objection." State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993) 
(citing Utah R. Evid. 103(a) (1)). Where a litigant "fail [s] to assert 
a claim of prejudice at the trial court, that issue is not properly 
preserved for appeal." J&. 
Defendant confined his argument below to whether the thefts and 
the murder were part of a single criminal episode and never claimed 
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that joinder of the charges unfairly prejudiced him (see R. 999-1015). 
Accordingly, any issue as to this prong of the analysis was not 
preserved and is waived, Larsen. 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12. 
Merits. Defendant could not satisfy the burden in any event. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, would not have excluded evidence 
of the thefts from a severed murder trial, nor evidence of the murder 
from a theft trial.8 
Smith holds that where one criminal act Mprecipitated" another, 
the former may be admissible to show motive and the latter may be 
admissible to show the defendant's "guilty conscience." Smith. 927 
P.2d at 653. See ftlSQ State v, Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah 
1986) (finding murder-related theft charges admissible under the 
predecessors to rule 404(b) and 403 to show motive and identity). 
Indeed, the majority if not universal rule is that rule 404(b)/s 
prohibition on evidence of uncharged misconduct does not exclude or 
even address evidence of criminal acts "connected together in their 
commission" or "part of a common scheme or plan." See, e.g.. United 
States v. Utter. 97 F.3d 509, 513 (11th Cir. 1996) (federal rule 404(b) 
8
 Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states: "Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
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does not exclude an uncharged offense which (1) "arose out of the 
same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, 
(2) [is] necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) [is] 
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged 
offense"); United States v. Murray. 89 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(other misconduct evidence is admissible even if it does not satisfy 
the requirements of rule 404(b) if it provides the jury with a complete 
story of the crime, that is necessary to avoid a chronological or 
conceptual void in the story of the crime, or is so connected that 
it explains the circumstances surrounding the charged crime); United 
States v. Kimball. 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995) (evidence is 
admissible when it provides context for the crime, is necessary to 
a full presentation of the case, or is appropriate in order to complete 
the story of the crime by proving its immediate context or res gestae) 
(quoting United States v. Masters. 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980)); 
United States v. Kennedy. 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (evidence 
is not considered "other crimes" evidence for purposes of rule 404(b) 
if it arose out of the same series of transactions as the charged 
offense or is necessary to complete the story of the crime), cert. 
denied sub nom. Ingram v. U.S.. 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995); Foster v. State. 
679 So.2d 747, 753 (Fla. 1996) (rule 404(b) did not require exclusion 
of evidence of stolen vehicle in murder case since the "evidence here 
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showed a continuing chain of chronological events" and Mt]he State 
can present to the jury the complete picture of the criminal episode"), 
cert, denied. No. 96-7011, 1996 WL 722829 (March 17, 1997); State 
v. Lockheart. 410 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Iowa App. 1987) (when acts are 
so connected in time and place that they form a continuous transaction, 
rule 404 (b) does not prevent the whole transaction from being shown 
"to complete the story of what happened"); State v. Flenoid. 838 P.2d 
462, 467 (Mo. App. 1992) ("Evidence of a separate crime that is a 
part of a sequence of events connected to the crime for which the 
defendant is being tried is admissible because it is part of the res 
gestae of the crime charged" and "to present a complete and coherent 
picture of events surrounding" the main charge). 
State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207 (Utah App. 1991), tacitly applied 
this majority rule. It held that although Utah R. Evid. 404 contains 
no express exception for "background information" showing how the 
charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled to paint a factual 
picture of the context in which the events in question transpired." 
Id. at 1210 n.4. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court earlier held that evidence 
showing "the general circumstances surrounding" the crime should not 
be excluded as "prior crimes" evidence. State v. Pierce. 722 P.2d 
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780, 782 (Utah 1986) (evidence that defendant purchased stolen property 
with marijuana was admissible over rule 404(b) objection). 
In fact, many Utah cases have followed a mere relevance standard 
of admissibility for evidence of criminal conduct relating to the 
charged offense. £££, State v. Gibson. 565 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977) 
(nif the evidence has relevance and probative value relating to his 
commission of the crime charged, the fact that it shows the commission 
of another crime does not render it incompetent"); State v. Kasai. 
27 Utah 2d 326, 329, 495 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1972) (same); State v. Baran. 
25 Utah 2d 16, 18, 474 P.2d 728, 730 (1970) (same); State v. Lopez. 
22 Utah 2d 257, 262, 451 P.2d 772, 775 (1969) (same); State v. Dickson. 
12 Utah 2d 8, 12, 361 P.2d 412, 415 (1961) (same). 
The majority rule applies here because the thefts arose out of 
the same series of events as the murder and were intertwined with 
it. Defendant fled in the stolen car and took the rifles to finance 
his flight. In addition, the stolen Ruger was the murder weapon and 
provided the strongest physical evidence tying defendant to the crime. 
Evidence of the thefts thus contextualized the murder and was necessary 
to paint a complete picture of the crime for the jury.9 
9
 Of course, "in many instances evidence offered to complete 
the story of the crime also will establish identity, motive, 
scheme or plan or otherwise be admissible as bearing on a 
material fact in issue." State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 548 
(continued...) 
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Defendant argues that the evidence of theft should have been 
excluded because "fleeing is not an element of murder." Br. Aplt. 
at 10-11. However, as the trial court correctly ruled (R. 536), 
evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt. 
Though unot sufficient in itself to establish guilt/' flight "may 
be considered by the jury in the light of all other evidence in the 
case determining guilt or innocence." State v. Howland. 761 P.2d 
579, 580 (Utah App. 1988). 
Defendant further argues that w[t]he fact that Appellant left 
the scene and sold the gun was enough to allow the State to offer 
their inference to the jury." Br. Aplt. at 11. This argument ignores 
the prosecution's right to paint a complete picture of the crime to 
the jury. See cases cited above. The prosecution is not required 
to present an incomplete or misleading picture of the case.10 
9(...continued) 
(Utah 1983) (quoting Ronald Boyce, "Evidence of Other Crimes or 
Wrongdoing," 51 Utah B.J. 31, 53 (1977)). Here, evidence of the 
thefts was relevant to establish defendant's identity, intent, 
and plan or scheme. In addition, as in Smith, one crime 
established the motive for the other. 
10
 Evidence providing context is typically highly probative. 
In Smith, this Court found that evidence supporting a charge of 
manslaughter by drug overdose was "highly probative to show 
Smith's motive and intent regarding the failure to report a dead 
body and evidence tampering charges. Without that evidence, the 
jury would have had no context within which to place either 
subsequent charge." Smith. 927 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added). 
(continued...) 
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Finally, any possible prejudice was mitigated by the following 
jury instruction: "Each offense [charged in the Information] and the 
evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately. The fact 
that you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty of one of the 
offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other 
offense charged against the defendant" (R. 504) . Such an instruction 
"would tend to offset any potential unfair prejudice" from joined 
charges. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 43 n.5 (addressing similar instruction). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH HIS SECOND 
APPOINTED ATTORNEY DID NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance 
of counsel because "[t]he deterioration of the attorney-client 
relationship rendered Appellant's counsel ineffective as a matter 
of law." Br. Aplt. at 16. Consequently, he argues, "[t]he Court 
erred by denying counsel's Motion to Withdraw." Id.11 
10
 (. . .continued) 
This probativeness "significantly outweighed" the prejudicial 
effect of the manslaughter evidence, which this Court noted 
"would naturally prejudice Smith." Id. 
The same is true here. Because the thefts and the murder 
were so intertwined, the murder evidence contextualized the theft 
charges, and vice versa. 
11
 Defendant does not rely on the Utah Constitution. Se^ 
Br. Aplt. 15. 
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Proceedings below. On 8 May 1996, a hearing was held on this 
issue, at which the court heard from defendant and from counsel (R. 
420). After the hearing, the trial court denied counsel's motion 
to withdraw on the grounds that (1) it had already removed one 
attorney; (2) Mr. Fratto was experienced, qualified, and competent; 
(3) there was "no legitimate basis" for defendant's refusal to 
cooperate with Mr. Fratto; and (4) u[t]here is [no] reason to believe 
based on defendant's past behavior [that] he will cooperate or be 
satisfied with another attorney" (R. 419-20, addendum E). 
Defendant did not include in the record on appeal a transcript 
of the 8 May hearing at which defendant's refusal to cooperate was 
discussed (R. 552). Nor does the record reflect the extent of 
communications between defendant and his counsel between that hearing 
and trial two months later. Incidental references suggest that, once 
he saw that he could not dismiss Mr. Fratto, defendant cooperated 
with him (see R. 940, 943) . 
Utah cases. This point is controlled by three Utah cases. The 
first is State v. Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d 120 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), 
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 803 (1987). Claiming that he had no faith 
in public defenders generally, Wulffenstein refused his appointed 
public defender, and the trial court refused to appoint a private 
attorney. Id. at 121. Wulffenstein therefore acted pro se in pretrial 
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proceedings, but was represented at trial by a public defender "acting 
as co-counsel." id. He claimed on appeal that he was 
unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in pretrial proceedings. 
Id. 
The supreme court affirmed. It noted that a defendant "is not 
guaranteed a 'meaningful relationship between counsel and accused."7 
Id. (quoting Morris v. Slappy. 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)). It held that 
[w]hether the accused's grievances with appointed counsel justify 
appointment of another attorney is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court." Id- The supreme court held that the trial court* 
had not abused its discretion in that case in view of the public 
defender's "willingness and ability and defendant's conjectured excuses 
for rejection [of the public defender]." Id-
The second controlling case is State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270 
(Utah App. 1987). On the morning of the first day of trial, Pursifell 
informed the court that he did not want to proceed with his present 
counsel because he did not "feel that she's done everything that she 
could in [his] case." Id- at 272. When the trial court asked for 
specifics, ua lengthy exchange ensued," but Pursifell "focused 
exclusively" on his claim that he did not receive timely notice of 
a hearing on a discovery motion. Id- The trial court denied 
Pursifell's motion for substitution. Id-
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On appeal, this Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the 
trial court inquired sufficiently into the reasons for defendant's 
dissatisfaction with his attorney; and (2) whether the trial court's 
denial of substitution contravened Pursifell's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. Id- at 
273-74. 
On the inquiry issue, the Pursifell Court noted that when a 
criminal defendant requests substitution of appointed counsel, the 
trial court is required to inquire sufficiently into the defendant's 
complaints to determine whether the attorney-client relationship "has 
deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution 
or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel would be violated but for substitution." Pursifell, 746 P.2d 
at 273 (citing United States Y. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 
1982)) . 
On the constitutional issue, the Pursifell Court stated, "When 
a defendant is forced to stand trial 'with the assistance of an 
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in an irreconcilable 
conflict,' he is deprived of the 'effective assistance of any counsel 
whatsoever' and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated." 
Id. at 274 (citing Brown v. Craven. 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 
1970)). Hence, * [substitution of counsel is mandatory when the 
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defendant has demonstrated good cause, such as a conflict of interest, 
a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict 
with his or her attorney." Id. (citing United States v. Welty. 674 
F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 
(2d Cir. 1981), cert, denied. 456 U.S. 917 (1982)). 
Pursifell himself satisfied neither requirement, and his conviction 
was affirmed. Id. at 273-75. 
The third controlling case is State v. Gardner. 888 P.2d 608 
(Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., with one justice concurring and two justices 
concurring in result), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 97 (1995). Gardner 
claimed that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because 
Gardner and his attorneys had an "acrimonious relationship." Id. 
at 621. The opinion states, "The fact that a defendant does not get 
along with his attorney does not, standing alone, establish a denial 
of the effective assistance of counsel. Gardner must also establish 
that the animosity resulted in such a deterioration of the 
attorney-client relationship that the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel was imperiled." Id- at 622. 
In other words, Gardner was required to "explain how this 
[animosity] adversely affected counsels1 [sic] performance." Id. 
at 621. &S££Ed Thomas v. Wainwright. 767 F.2d 738, 743-44 (11th Cir. 
1985) (to prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, even 
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a defendant who refuses to cooperate with counsel "must 'identify 
the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been 
the result of reasonable professional judgment"') (quoting Strickland 
Vt Wfrgfringtpn, 104 s. ct . 2052, 2066 (1984)), cert, denied, 475 u .s . 
1031 (1986). Gardner failed in this showing. 888 P.2d at 622. 
A. Defendant does not claim inadequate inquiry. 
Defendant does not claim that the trial court failed to make 
a reasonable inquiry into his complaints. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-18. 
Indeed, defendant is precluded from making such a claim. Since the 
record of the trial court's inquiry is not before this Court, it must 
presume the regularity of the proceedings below. State v. Linden. 
761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988); Call v. City of West Jordan. 788 
P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); 
Sampson vf RichinS/ 770 p.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.), cert- denied, 
776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989); Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
B. Defendant's denial of counsel claim fails. 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim fails because the communication 
breakdown of which he complains was of his own making. According 
to counsel's affidavit, defendant Mid not wish to speak to [the 
defense investigator] or cooperate in the preparation of the case"; 
he "refused" counsel's "request for an interview"; and he exhibited 
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"an unwillingness to cooperate with counsel in [trial] preparation." 
(R. 366-67, addendum D). 
Defendant claims that a breakdown in communication constitutes -
ineffective assistance of counsel irrespective of "who was to blame, 
or who was right or wrong . . . It matters not." Br. Aplt. at 17. 
On the contrary, Wulffenstein is clear that a defendant's unjustified 
refusal to accept or cooperate with his appointed attorney does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursifell's requirement 
that a defendant demonstrate "good cause" for substitution also 
supports this conclusion. 
Other jurisdictions agree that a "defendant cannot base a claim 
of inadequate representation upon his refusal to cooperate with 
appointed counsel." Shaw v. United States, 403 F.2d 528, 529 (8th 
Cir. 1968). Accord Thomas v. State. 421 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla. 1982) 
(defendant may not "create an issue of ineffective counsel on the 
basis of his refusal to cooperate"); Bolden v. State. 480 S.E.2d 
395, 397 (Ga. App. 1997) (defendant "cannot refuse to cooperate with 
his attorney and then claim that counsel failed to adequately prepare 
him as a witness"); State v. Ferguson. 864 P.2d 693, 701-03 (Kan. 
1993) (defendant's right to counsel was not violated where "absolute" 
breakdown in attorney-client communication was "due to her refusal 
to communicate or cooperate with her counsel"); State v. Craig. 906 
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P.2d 683, 689 (Mont. 1995) ("A defendant who refuses to cooperate 
in his own defense cannot complain of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.*), certt denied, 116 S. Ct. 1689 (1996). See also Thomas. 
767 F.2d at 742 ("A defendant, by unreasonable silence or intentional 
lack of cooperation, cannot thwart the law as to appointment of 
counsel.*). This rule is a corollary to the proposition that "a party 
who participates in or contributes to an error cannot complain of 
it." Craig. 906 P.2d at 689 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
The trial court determined Mr. Fratto to be ''experienced, 
qualified, and competent," and found "no legitimate basis for the 
defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with 
his court-appointed counsel in the preparation of the case" (R. 419). 
"This court defers to the trial court's factual findings and 
accordingly will disturb those findings only if they are clearly 
erroneous." State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). "To show clear error, the appellant must marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an 
attack." State v. Hiaaenbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
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Defendant has made no effort to attack the trial court's findings 
in the prescribed manner, nor could any such attack succeed: since 
the trial court's findings are based on statements of defendant and 
his counsel in an untranscribed hearing, this Court is constrained 
to presume the regularity of the proceedings below. Call. 788 P.2d 
at 1053. 
Moreover, although defendant claims that the attorney-client 
relationship deteriorated, he identifies no "acts or omissions of 
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment" as required by Gardner and Strickland. 
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that he was deprived 
of the effective assistance of counsel. If anything, w[w]hat appears 
of record is that defendant's appointed counsel [was] apparently denied 
the effective assistance of defendant, who refused to communicate 
or cooperate with [him] ..." Bolden, 480 S.E.2d at 397 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S "WAIVER OF COUNSEL" CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE WAS 
REPRESENTED AT TRIAL 
Defendant claims that "by not cooperating with counsel (whether 
his reasons were valid or not)/' he effectively waived the right to 
counsel, thereby triggering the court's duty under Faretta v. 
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California. 422 U.S. 806 (1975), to "determine that [he] was doing 
so knowingly and intelligently." Br. of Aplt. at 19. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, as noted above, 
the record does not establish that defendant refused to cooperate 
with his counsel between May and July. To the extent that the record 
is silent on this question, defendant bears the burden of that silence. 
To the extent the record touches upon this issue, it suggest that, 
once the trial court impressed upon defendant that he had no chance 
to force a substitution of counsel, defendant in fact cooperated with 
Mr. Fratto (see R. 940, 943). 
Second, defendant was in fact represented at trial. On the first 
day of trial, Mr. Fratto announced his appearance as defendant's 
attorney; when asked if the defense was ready to proceed, he responded, 
"We are" (R. 562). He introduced himself to the jury venire with 
the words, UI represent Carl Scales" (R. 694). He participated in 
jury selection (see, e.g.. R. 607-08, 612, 617, 655, 659); made an 
opening statement (R. 674-76) ; interposed objections (see, e.g.. R. 
729, 739, 831, 874, 880); cross- and recross-examined witnesses (see, 
e.g.. R. 787-91, 883-87, 931); and made a closing argument (R. 960-76). 
Also, after the prosecution rested, Mr. Fratto made a record outside 
the hearing of the jury to the effect that defendant's decision not 
to testify in his own behalf was knowingly and voluntarily made uin 
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consultation with me" (R. 940). Defendant also acknowledged discussing 
this issue with counsel (see R. 943) . If defendant felt that he was 
not in fact represented at trial, he never communicated that fact 
to the court. 
Defendant certainly did not "represent himself," State v. McDonald, 
922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah App. 1996), "conduct his own defense," State 
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), or "proceed pro se." 
Id. 
Because defendant did not elect to waive counsel or represent 
himself, no inquiry into his election was required. See Bunn v. State. 
257 S.E.2d 364, 365 (Ga. App. 1979) (a claim that a defendant did 
not properly waive his right to counsel cannot succeed where that 
defendant was in fact represented by counsel at trial). Accordingly, 
this claim fails. 
POINT IV 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT DEPENDANT ACTED 
INTENTIONALLY OR WITH DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE IN SHOOTING HIS 
WIFE SIX TIMES WHILE SHE LAY IN BED 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
a conviction of murder. Relying exclusively on State v. Petree. 659 
P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), he argues that "even if defendant did cause 
the death [of his wife,] [the evidence] was manifestly insufficient 
to prove that he did so intelligently, and knowingly, as was charged 
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in the complaint." Br. of Aplt. at 23. "The evidence more correctly 
points to manslaughter/' he concludes. Br. Aplt. at 25. 
"In considering that question, [this Court will] review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [It will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." Petree. 659 P.2d at 444 (citations omitted). 
Defendant's argument proceeds on a faulty premise. The amended 
information did not charge that defendant killed his wife 
"intelligently, and knowingly," as defendant asserts. Br. of Aplt. 
at 23. Rather, "intentionally or knowingly" was one of three 
alternative mental states the jury had to find in order to convict 
defendant of murder (R. 1) .12 
12
 The amended information charged that defendant: 
a. Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another 
. . ., OR 
b. Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
caused the death of another, . . . OR 
(continued...) 
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Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
evidence here was not so *inconclusive or inherently improbable" that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
defendant killed Kayleen Scales intentionally or knowingly.13 
Defendant borrowed the murder weapon from his brother-in-law 
the day of the murder, claiming that he wanted to kill a rat, but 
never went after a rat with it. ££fi page 10 herein. Although a 
credulous juror might conceivably believe defendant's claim that he 
borrowed the rifle to kill a rat, reasonable jurors could draw the 
more likely inference that defendant borrowed the rifle with the intent, 
to kill his wife. This inference supports a finding that defendant 
12
 (. . .continued) 
c. Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
caused the death of another . . . 
(R. 1). Jury instruction no. 1 repeated this language (R. 512). 
The amended information and jury instruction tracked the elements 
of the crime of murder as set out in its statutory definition. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (a)- (c) (1995) . 
The jury need not have been unanimous "as to the particular 
alternative under the single crime of second degree murder." 
State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1032(Utah 1994) (citing State v. 
Russell. 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987). 
13
 A man acts intentionally "when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result"; he acts knowingly "when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-103 (1995). 
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killed Kayleen intentionally or knowingly, since the act was 
premeditated. 
Defendant shot Kayleen six times in the head through two pillows 
while she was lying in bed. See page 9 herein. She suffered no 
defensive wounds, and the trailer showed no signs of struggle. See 
pages 9 and 12 herein. From these facts, reasonable jurors could 
infer that Kayleen was sleeping or resting when defendant killed 
her. They could further infer that defendant used the pillows the 
muffle the sound of the gunshots and thus avoid detection. These 
inferences support a finding that defendant killed intentionally or 
knowingly. 
Defendant marshals none of these facts. See Br. Aplt. at 22-24. 
Rather, he argues that the evidence, "seen in any light, was of a 
crime of passion." J&. at 24. He points to the torn-up marriage 
certificate, uthe messy room, the multiple shots and the very real 
possibility that Appellant stayed with the body of his wife for any 
hours before leaving . . ." Id. None of these facts undermines the 
jury's verdict. 
The torn-up marriage certificate proves only that the marriage 
was in crisis; when the certificate was torn up or by whom is unclear. 
Kayleen may have torn it up the morning of the murder, provoking 
defendant's plan to kill her that night. The room may have been messy, 
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but it showed no signs of a struggle (R. 753); hence the messiness 
does not support defendant's argument. Nor do the multiple shots: 
considering that they were fired through pillows, the multiple shots -
indicate intent more strongly than they do recklessness. Finally, 
there is no evidence concerning how long defendant remained in the 
trailer after the murder. However long it was, the most likely 
inference to be drawn from defendant's lingering in the trailer is 
that he needed to wait until morning to talk Kayleen's grandmother 
out of her car for his escape. 
In short, the facts of this case are light years from Petree. 
This jury was not asked to convict defendant based on anything so 
''inconclusive or inherently improbable" as defendant's descriptions 
of a *strange dream" and the other evidence rejected in Petree. 
Cf. Petree. 659 P.2d at 444-47. On the contrary, the jury acted well 
within the realm of reasonableness in convicting defendant of murder. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on {_ April 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
D.O.B. 09-06-61 
AMENDED
 Q "* >99$ 
INFORMATION-.... . " * ° ' ^ / > 
*** <V 
"tty 
• • $ * 
CRIMINAL NO. 
DEFENDANT. 
The undersigned, Robert L. Berry, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNT I. MURDER, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, UCA 1953 as amended, 
a First Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 6th daytaf August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Carl William Scales: ^ 
fk*1 
a. Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, to wit: Kayleen Jones 
Scales, OR 
b. Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that caused the death of another, to wit:, Kayleen Jones 
Scales, OR ***><* *'-
c. Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
caused the death of another, to wit:, Kayleen Jones Scales. 
COUNT n. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, 
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Mabel C. 
Jones, with a purpose to deprive Mabel C. Jones of said property and that said property was an 
operable motor vehicle. 
COUNT m. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, 
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones, 
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, to 
wit: a.22 caliber Winchester pump rifle. 
COUNT IV. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, 
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones, 
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, to 
wit: a .22 caliber Winchester single shot rifle. 
COUNT V. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, 
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones, 
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, to 
wit: a.22 caliber Ruger rifle. 
COUNT VI. THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, 
a Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1995, in Summit County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Carl William Scales, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of Wade Jones, 
with a purpose to deprive Wade Jones of said property and that said property was a firearm, 
to wit: a 30-06 rifle. 
This Information is supported by a Statement of Probable Cause as follows: 
Complainant is employed as a Detective with the Summit County Sheriffs Department and 
has been personally involved in the investigation of the death of Kayleen Jones Scales. The 
information set forth herein has been personally obtained by the complainant or by other deputies 
0UU-
of the Summit County Sheriffs Department. 
The defendant, Carl William Scales, married Kayleen Jones Scales on May 4, 1995. On 
August 7, 1995 the defendant and Kayleen Scales were residing in a mobile home at 
approximately 3330 East Chalk Creek Road, Summit County, Utah. 
On August 6,1995 at about 9:00 p.m., Kay Jones, the mother of Kayleen Jones, heard the 
Defendant and Kayleen Jones Scales arguing loudly at the mobile home located at approximately 
3330 East Chalk Creek Road. 
At approximately 9:00 a.m., on August 7, 1995, the defendant went to Kayleen Jones1 
grandmother, Mabel C. Jones, who resides at 3320 East Chalk Creek Road, Coalville, Utah, and 
indicated he obtained a job at Flare Construction and his wife, said it would be okay if he 
borrowed Mabel Jones' vehicle to get to work. Defendant advised Mabel C. Jones he would 
return the vehicle at 4:00 p.m. on August 7, 1995. Mabel Jones allowed the defendant to take 
the automobile based upon his representations to her that he would return the vehicle by 4:00 
p.m.. 
During the early evening hours of August 7, 1995, Wade Jones discovered the deceased 
body of Kayleen Jones Scales at the trailer on Chalk Creek Road, Coalville, Utah. The Summit 
County Sheriffs Department was contacted and investigated the death. Hie medical examiner's 
office determined that Kayleen Jones had been shot multiple times in the head with a small caliber 
firearm. The medical examiner's office estimated time of death was approximately 1:00 a.m. to 
3:00 a.m. on August 7, 1995. Most of the defendant's clothing had been removed from the 
residence along with four firearms belonging to Wade Jones which were kept at the mobile home; 
those four firearms are a .22 caliber Winchester pump rifle, a .22 caliber Winchester single shot 
rifle, a .22 caliber Ruger rifle, and a 30.06 rifle. Wade Jones told the Summit County Deputies 
that he owned the mobile home in which Kayleen Jones Scales and the Defendant were living, but 
that the four firearms belonged to him, and he had never authorized the defendant, or anyone else, 
to use or remove the firearms from the mobile home. 
Defendant fled from Summit County, Utah, shortly after he obtained the automobile 
belonging to Mabel Jones. Defendant did not return the automobile to Mabel Jones by 4:00 p.m. 
on August 7, 1995, but instead fled the State of Utah and went to Reno, Nevada. Defendant was 
arrested driving the vehicle of Mabel Jones by officers from the Nevada Highway Patrol in Reno, 
Nevada. Following the defendant's arrest, the vehicle of Mabel Jones was impounded by Nevada 
authorities. 
Complainant and Detective Sergeant Joe Offret went to Reno, Nevada and had the vehicle 
of Mabel Jones secured and transported to the Summit County Sheriffs Office in Coalville, Utah. 
At the time of the defendant's arrest by Nevada authorities, Nevada officers found two firearms 
in the vehicle, which they left in the trunk of Mabel Jones' vehicle. When the vehicle was 
searched after it was returned to Summit County, the Complainant discovered two of the four 
firearms that were stolen from Wade Jones, those being the Winchester .22 caliber rifles. The 
th in.* 
.22 caliber Ruger rifle and the 30.06 have not been recovered. 
Based on the Complainant's investigation of the shooting of Kayleen Jones Scales, 
Complainant has determined that the defendant was last seen with the decedent at approximately 
9:00 p.m. on August 6, 1996, when they were arguing loudly. After the defendant obtained the 
automobile from Mabel Jones, the defendant told the Complainant that he returned to the mobile 
home, packed his belongings, got gasoline out of another vehicle which he put in Mabel Jones' 
vehicle, and then left the mobile home sometime after 9:00 a.m. on August 7, 1995. 
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0 . Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F I L E D 
JUL 21 1336 
G«t of Summit Couirty 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
PLAINTIFF 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
DEFENDANT. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SEVER 
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts n, HI, IV, V and VI from Count I came on 
regularly for hearing before the court on June 10,1996. Defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Joseph Fratto, Jr.; the State appeared through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit 
County Attorney and Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney. The court 
having considered the Motion and the pleadings submitted in support of and opposition to the 
Motion, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having verbally entered its decision on the 
record, hereby makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant stands accused of murdering his wife, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales on or about 
August 6 or 7, 1995. 
0O3*J 
2. The homicide is alleged to have been committed through the use of a .22 caliber 
firearm. 
3. That on August 7, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the defendant went to the home of Mabel 
Jones, who is the grandmother of the victim, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales. The home of Mabel 
Jones is located approximately 200 yards from the trailer where the defendant and the victim 
resided, and where the body of Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales was discovered later on August 7, 
1995. 
4. Defendant asked Mabel Jones if he could borrow her automobile to travel to an area 
called South Fork, which is just a few miles from the home of Mabel Jones in Summit County, 
Utah. The defendant claimed that his wife's vehicle had thrown a rod, and that he needed to 
borrow Mabel Jones' automobile. 
5. Mabel Jones agreed to loan the defendant her automobile, so that he could travel to 
South Fork. 
6. Shortly thereafter, the defendant left the scene of the murder. 
7. The State claims that at the time the defendant left the scene of the murder on the 
morning of August 7, 1995, that he took with him four firearms belonging to Wade Jones, those 
being three 22 rifles and a 30-06 rifle. 
8. The State claims that the murder weapon was one of the 22 rifles that defendant took 
with him when he left the murder scene on the morning of August 7, 1995. 
2 
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9. The State claims that the defendant sold the 30-06 rifle and one of the 22 rifles in 
Nevada on August 7, 1995 and August 8, 1995. 
10. The State claims that the other two 22 rifles were found in the trunk of Mabel Jones' 
vehicle when the defendant was arrested by the Nevada Highway Patrol on August 8, 1995 near 
Reno, Nevada. 
11. The trier of fact could draw a reasonable inference that the defendant committed the 
act of murder, for which he is charged in Count I, by the fact that the defendant fled from the 
murder scene. 
12. Evidence of defendant's flight will be presented at the trial, and evidence as to how 
defendant obtained possession of Mabel Jones' vehicle and that the defendant fled with four 
firearms, when he left the murder scene, will be presented to the trier of fact as part of the 
defendant's flight after allegedly committing the murder. 
13. The State has and will argue that the flight was accomplished by the defendant 
obtaining the vehicle from Mabel Jones and by taking the firearms to either finance defendant's 
flight from the murder scene, or to dispose of evidence from the murder scene, the .22 caliber 
rifle. 
14. The events of the homicide, and the thefts of the automobile and the four firearms 
are closely related in time and place. 
15. The defendant allegedly fled the murder scene shortly after the death of Sheila 
Kayleen Jones Scales and obtained the firearms from the trailer, in which the victim had been 
3 
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killed, and obtained the vehicle belonging to Mabel Jones, approximately 200 yards from the 
scene of the murder. 
16. Flight is a factor that the trier of fact can consider in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the accused in this case. 
17. If the theft counts were severed from the murder count, the State would still be able 
to present its evidence regarding the theft of the vehicle and the firearms during the murder trial. 
18. The thefts of the car and firearms are integral, as they relate to the commission of 
the murder or flight after the commission of the murder. 
19. It is proper to join the murder charge in Count I with the theft counts in Counts II 
through VI inclusive. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. It is proper to join and to try Count I, Murder, with the Theft charges as contained 
in Counts II through VI inclusive of the Information. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Sever should be denied. 
DATED this 0$ day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
^?_ 
-/——*• 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
\ fl&»«*sf y 
0D'6O 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this 
15th day of July, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East, 





F I L E D 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS-
MOTION TO SEVER 
PLAINTIFF : 
VS. : CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, : 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
DEFENDANT. 
Defendant's Motion to Sever came on regularly for hearing on June 10,1996, before the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge. Defendant appeared in person and with counsel, 
Joseph Fratto, Jr.; plaintiff appeared through Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and 
Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney. The court considered defendant's 
Motion, and the pleadings in support and opposition thereto, heard the arguments of counsel, 
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being 
fully advised in the premises, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's Motion to Sever be, and 
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DATED this _2_a?day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge /^SUMMIT \ g l 
1SEI • - ^ CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING ! £ % COUNTY f ""'I 
\ \ ^ / / 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing, postage f^agj iVrap ^ 
15th day of July, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East, 
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
U^ g^ vg o^/^^c^y^ 
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ADDENDUM D 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
No. 
P I L E D * " 
MAY 3 1996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
Defendant. 
: AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
: 
Case No. 951300063 FS 
Judge Pat Brian 
STATE OF UTAH : 
} ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., upon his oath, deposes and says the 
following: 
1. That I am the attorney of record representing Carl W. 
Scales, in the above-entitled matter. I was appointed to represent 
the defendant pursuant to a contract to provide said 
representation. 
2. That trial In the above matter is scheduled for May 29, 
1996, and a hearing on motions is scheduled for May 13, 1996. 
3. That pursuant to the prosecutor's Petition For Inquiry 
Into Mental Condition of Defendant, defendant was sent to the Utah 
State Hospital. Following that evaluation and the return of the 
Uiioo 
report Indicating defendant's competency to proceed with trial, a 
hearing was held on April 22, 1996. Present with counsel for the 
defendant was David West ley, who has been employed as an 
investigator to assist in the above-entitled matter. The defendant 
Indicated to affiant, at this hearing, that he did not wish to 
speak to him or cooperate in the preparation of the case. The 
defendant expressed to the court that he did not want to proceed 
with affiant as his counsel. 
4. That on or about April 25, 1996, a copy of a letter sent 
by defendant to the Utah Bar Association was received by affiant. 
In that letter defendant requests the Bar assist in changing the 
venue of the legal proceedings pending in this matter and outlines 
complaints with the investigator, aforesaid, and with affiant. 
Those complaints include a belief that counsel conspired with the 
prosecutor to have defendant committed to the hospital for the 
evaluation. Such allegations indicate a deterioration of the 
relationship between counsel and defendant, which relationship is 
necessary for adequate and effective representation. 
5. That on May 1, 1996 I attempted to have contact with 
defendant at the Summit County Jail. My request for an interview 
was refused by him. I subsequently received from defendant, 
further correspondence, dated April 29, 1996, in which defendant 
requests copies of "information relating to my case91 and a specific 
list of information, including reports, evaluations and laboratory 
results. This request is a further indication of the deterioration 
2 
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of the relationship and defendants desire to have affiant withdraw 
as the counsel in the matter. 
6. That it is affiant1 s information and belief that 
defendant has independently filed motions, including a Motion for 
Change of Venue in the above matter. Defendant has not sent 
affiant copies of these pleadings. The filing of this motion and 
the failure to send a copy indicate an unwillingness to cooperate 
with counsel in preparation, a lack of trust, the deterioration of 
the relationship and a desire by defendant to have counsel 
withdraw. 
7. That the foregoing make it impossible for counsel to 
adequately and effectively represent defendant in the proceedings 
pending before the Court. 
DATED this 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this 
1996, in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
& 
1996. 
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
VS. 
PLAINTIFF 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
DEFENDANT 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AND 
GRANTING MOTION TO 
CONTINUE 
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Motion of Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., for Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of Record in 
the above-entitled matter, came on regularly for hearing on the 8th day of May, 1996, at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. The State of Utah was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L. 
Christiansen. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. The 
court having listened to the arguments of counsel and statements of defendant, and good cause 
appearing therefore, it is 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Leave to Withdraw be, and the same hereby 
is, denied. The basis for denial of said Motion is as follows: (1) The court had heretofore on 
the 22nd day of January, 1996, granted Defendant's Motion to Terminate the Services of Backup 
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Public Defender, Glen A. Cook; (2) Defense counsel, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., is an experienced, 
qualified, and competent attorney to represent the defendant; (3) There is no legitimate basis for 
the defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with his court-appointed 
counsel in the preparation of the case; and (4) There is reason to believe based on defendant's 
past behavior he will cooperate or be satisfied with another attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is continued from May 29, 1996, to July 9, 
1996, at the request of defendant's counsel to enable him to prepare for trial with or without the 
cooperation of defendant. 
DATED this day of May, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
/? 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING •% OF 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing this day of 
May, 1996, postage prepaid, to Joseph C. Fratto, attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East, 
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
?s?sS /^/y^/^^P/^? 
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